

CARE Iraq Assessment

Shelter/NFI Strategy & Response Options

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IDPs family themselves in commercial privately owned buildings under construction on the outskirts of Dohuk.



940 families are staying in this public school in Zakho



960 families are staying in tents in the informal camp Wargh Dala in Zakho.

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Introduction

This report presents the findings of shelter needs and recommended response options for shelter and household non-food items following an assessment undertaken by CARE in the Kurdish Region of Iraq between the 24th and 29th of August 2014.

The assessment was led by CARE Germany, and the shelter component of the assessment was undertaken by Anna Wachtmeister with remote support from Kate Crawford, on behalf of the CARE International Emergency Shelter Team.

Summary

Incoming population

This table summarises the numbers of new IDPs in each shelter situation based on IOM's DTM (August 24th). The majority in Erbil are unsupported in rental or hosted situations (in an existing population with housing-related vulnerabilities deriving from low incomes, displacement and gender) while the majority in Dohuk are in collective centres without coordinated support.

Estimated vulnerable existing population and IDP influx	Dohuk: new IDPs by % of IDP households		Erbil: new IDPs by % of IDP households		Comments
	100%	100%	100%	100%	
Total (% of existing)	100%	100%	100%	100%	
Hotel	22%	4%	71%	44%	Largely unsupported by international community, reliant on local humanitarians or IDP's own funds
Renting		4%		22%	
Own house		0%		0%	
Hosted (relatives)		14%		3%	
Hosted (non-relatives)		0%		2%	
Religious Building		46%		12%	
Unfinished Buildings	23%		3%		
Collective Centre	7%		0%		
Private camps/tents	5%		0%		
School	31%	21%	12%	5%	Main focus of KRG / UN and international support
Formal camps		10%		3%	
Military camps		0%		4%	
Other	1%	1%	0%	0%	Largely unsupported by international community, limited

Existing population and vulnerabilities

These figures are based on applying the proportions of vulnerable groups in Erbil City in 2009 to the latest governorate level population data so **must be confirmed by further assessment** of host communities.

Categories of vulnerability were as follows: high priority is low (28.3%) and very low (31.5%) income households earning less than \$450/month, IDPs, returnees, women-headed households; medium priority are in informal areas, small overcrowded or substandard housing, tenants or shared accommodation; low priority are other households. What these data suggest is that overall numbers and the IDP population as a percentage of the host population are higher in Duhok: locations in Duhok are vulnerable locations and a strategic priority.

The KRG's current housing strategy recognises that returnees, previous waves of IDPs and local host communities all face shelter-related vulnerabilities - from affordable housing, repair of damaged housing to shared infrastructure and struggles to find employment. Any strategy for new waves of IDPs will be overlaid onto this complex picture.

Estimated vulnerable existing population and IDP influx		Duhouk			Erbil		
		% at Governorate Level		Population estimates (Ministry of Construction and Housing, 2012)	% at Governorate Level		Population estimates (Ministry of Construction and Housing, 2012)
		% of Total Existing Populatio	% of Total Existing Populatio		% of Total Existing Populatio	% of Total Existing Populatio	
				Governorate Households	Governorate Households		
Overall Total		100%	100%	233,418	100%	100%	506,924
Existing Population	Existing Total	77%	76.8%	179,200	94%	94.4%	478,500
	High priority*	46%	45.9%	107,162	56%	56.4%	286,143
	Medium priority**	22%	22.4%	52,326	28%	27.6%	139,722
	Low priority*	8%	8.4%	19,712	10%	10.4%	52,635
IDPs	IDP Total	23%	23.2%	54,218	6%	5.6%	28,424
	Hotel	5%	0.9%	2,189	4%	2.5%	12,624
	Renting		0.9%	2,202		1.2%	6,166
	Own house		0.0%			0.0%	
	Hosted (relatives)		3.2%	7,385		0.2%	798
	Hosted (non-relatives)	0.0%			0.1%	540	
	Religious Building	11%	2.8%	6,546	1%	0.8%	3,870
	Unfinished Buildings		5.2%	12,237		0.2%	905
	Collective Centre		1.5%	3,590		0.0%	
	Private camps/tents		1.1%	2,656		0.0%	
	School	7%	4.8%	11,213	1%	0.3%	1,491
	Formal camps		2.4%	5,650		0.2%	830
	Military camps		0.0%			0.2%	1,200
	Other	0%	0.2%	550	0%	0.0%	

August 2014

Current response (activities, strategies and capacities)

- Local community humanitarian response: food, accommodation and money to incoming IDPs
- KRG: The KRG is pro-active, organized and in charge. The UN and the KRG are collaborating to realize and manage the formal camps. It's unsure that resources will be available for all 25-27 planned formal camps.
- International Community: focus on formal camps, early discussion of host community support

Gaps

- Unmet needs: Formal camps may have insufficient capacity; Hosting and renting may be unsustainable if unsupported; People staying in open places and unfinished buildings are largely unsupported
- Coherent international approach to new IDPs and existing population in terms of humanitarian standards and equity: currently support not equitable or documented geographically
- Funding and capacity to deliver: the estimated costs and funding available remain unclear but reports suggest a funding gap.

Risks

- Inequitable response and potential instability between different incoming groups and different existing population groups
- Approach of winter
- Food and fuel supply shortages

Recommendations

Needs	Options on proposed key activities	Target groups				
		Private/ informal tenting / make shift camps	Unfinished Buildings	Rental + Hotels	With Host families & relatives	Host community
Adequate equitable shelter and sustaining non-camp shelter (including with non-shelter related support)	Support to KRG/Cluster to identify alternative shelter solutions and piloting them <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessment and analysis Proofing concepts Practical recommendations to others 	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Winterisation of settlements and shelter	Creation of collective warm spaces (winterised communal tents or rehabilitation of existing communal buildings) with technical assistance to community on how to winterize tents and settlement with very limited NFI.	✓	✓			
	Winterization NFIs via markets or distribution (self – help kit with little technical assistance)		✓			
Clothing	Distribution of clothing NFI family kits	✓	✓			
	Clothing Fair (Based on CARE’s DRC Goma approach – bringing all vendors and selected IDPs to one place, traders benefit while IDPs get choice)	✓	✓			✓
	Similar scheme can be set up for Winterisation NFIs.					
	Vouchers to buy at the local market	✓	✓			
Information	Information centres (accessing government + humanitarian assistance, nullifying rumours about immigration possibilities?, etc)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Approach

- **Ensuring that needs of people in different shelter conditions are met in the most vulnerable locations:** focus on people in non-camp settlement sites. CARE to support alternative, non-camp sheltering solutions. Vulnerable locations: underserved districts in Dohuk Governorate and in the urban areas (Zakho and Dohuk). Total population: **485,000 IDPs** (54% of local existing population)
- **Ensuring equity** by addressing the needs of vulnerable IDPs and of vulnerable host-communities with the objective of sustaining hosting and rental arrangements and maintaining stability. Particular attention will be paid to the needs of men, women, boys and girls, since the conflict has separated families and female-headed households were already identified as having shelter-related vulnerabilities alongside, previous IDP groups and families on very low incomes
- **Multi-sector enabling support** that ensures dignity and maximizes beneficiary choices and helps people prepare for winter
- **Strategic support to the coordination mechanism** potentially for assessments (i.e. the capacities and vulnerabilities of hosts, hosted and renting populations and the rental housing market; and fuel and food markets) and in advocating for and supporting a coherent and equitable response.

The current shelter situation (Displacement into the KRI)

The KRI is a semi-autonomous region of Iraq with ambitions for further self-determination. Fuelled by oil and gas reserves, under the watchful eye of the Peshmerga, the Region is prosperous and largely stable. Some people are even calling it the next Dubai. The Region is largely reliant on oil and imports most goods and also expertise. Very few building materials are produced or assembled locally. It is unclear if the government owned cement plants and brick factories in the KRI are operational, Lafarge runs 3 successful cement plants and over 30 aggregate and concrete establishments in Iraq. But Lafarge has a big facility in KRI Iraq is Turkey's second largest export country.

Displacement is protracted in Iraq. 1.2 million people are estimated to have been displaced between 2003 and 2006 and 1.6 million are estimated to have been internally displaced since 2006 (Ministry of Displacement and Migration, 2008; Ministry of Displacement and Migration and UN-Habitat, 2012). Today the IDP figure has reached 1.8 million in Iraq. Of this 16% aim to resettle, 35 % to return and 44% to integrate. 50% of the IDPs are under 18, 13% are women headed households. (ION feb 2011, Iraq wide) – *No 2011 figures of displacement into the KRI found.*

Existing Population

Current priority issues in the housing sector are: assistance to support returnees to repair or rehabilitate their original houses, damaged or destroyed during the conflict; new affordable and adequate housing assistance for IDP households that wish to integrate locally or resettle. Recognising the needs of returnees, IDPs and host communities, the current strategy proposes housing approaches matched to the needs of different groups (understood in terms of status of land ownership, income range and appropriate types and finance) and with an emphasis on opening livelihood opportunities to IDPs, host communities and vulnerable groups, especially women headed households.

"Programme planners (MoMD, MMPW, MoCH) to allocate a proportion of IDP project budget towards services and/or housing which benefit the host communities. In particular, elements which will assist the most vulnerable section of the host community with comparable needs."

- **Existing population (Duhok 179,200 households, Erbil 478,500):** Despite the construction boom, a housing deficit remains in KRG. Land and housing availability varies from place to place (e.g. Erbil City has nearly doubled its housing plots from less than 80,000 in 2004 to nearly 150,000 in 2009 but many remain undeveloped). Estimated population growth rates in Erbil City are 3.2% in 2007 (Mumtaz, 2009) and for Kurdistan as a whole this was estimated at 2.5% in 2010 (Kurdistan Board of Investment, 2014). (see annex Housing policy, infrastructure and property markets to this report).
- To meet KRG need, **according to the Affordable Housing Strategies in Kurdistan Region (June 2012 by the Republic of Iraq, KRG, Ministry of Construction and Housing, UNHABITAT)** a 100 houses need to be build every day. There is no mechanism for those with limited income to access housing. Very few options for further land within the city boundaries.

Households and housing deficit	Dohuk			Erbil			KRI		
	Households	Annual housing need	% needs	Households	Annual housing need	% needs	Households	Annual housing needs	% needs
Total Households 2012	179,200	6,300	4%	478,500	12,300	3%	1,130,400	31,000	3%
Capital city HH	43,000	1,500	3%	243,000	6,400	3%	489,700	13,200	3%
Other Urban HH	86,000	3,000	3%	153,000	3,800	2%	428,500	11,800	3%
Rural HH (heavily urbanised)	50,200	1,800	4%	82,500	2,100	3%	805,000	6,000	1%

Average household size is 5.9 people; Average annual growth rate = 2.5 %. Source: the Affordable Housing Strategies in Kurdistan Region 2012

- **Existing shelter-vulnerable groups including prior IDPs (approx.to be confirmed from other sources or assessment Duhok 107,000, Erbil 286,000 households):** It has a long history of receiving refugees but also IDPs. The people of the Region remember well when they fled on mass into the mountains less than a generation ago.
- **Syrian refugees (215 000 in KRI)** are based in camps and receive a holistic set of support – the system has been established over the last years. Syrian refugees have freedom of movement and can obtain work permits inside KRI, but generally stay in the camps.

Incoming Population

The UN estimate that 850,000 IDPs from other parts of Iraq have arrived to the KRI region this year, the vast majority in the last 11 weeks in 2 distinct waves (June 2014 and 13-18th of august) from 2 distinct incidents ('the fall of Mosul' and 'Sinjal Mountain'). Of this 850,000, 656,250 are in the Governorates of Dohuk and Erbil.

	IDPs as % of existing population	Total existing population (KRG estimates)	IDP population (IOM DTM)	Syrian Refugees (REACH)
All KRG	16% (8.6% Syrian Refugess)	5,200,000	850,000	215,000
Dohuk	54%	895,000	485,706	
Erbil	12%	1,409,000	170,544	

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The Region normally houses 5.2 million inhabitants, today houses 6.3 million with the recent influx of IDPs and refugees. The situation is more intense to the north of the Region, where the districts of Sumel and Zakho are both hosting 30% more people.

The IDPs come from distinct ethnic minorities (Mainly Yezedi and Christian but also Turkmen Shia, Shabak, Kakaiz and Arab). In many cases, deep mistrust is reported between communities. There have been reports of Sunni Arab neighbours supporting IS atrocities towards their Yazidi or Christian neighbours after IS arrival in their villages. There are also subgroups. For example the Yezedis arriving from Mosul and Sinjal are distinct. In terms of language the group arriving from Sinjal speak Arabic and Kurdish while the group from Mosul and surroundings largely Arabic. Their affiliation to either Kurdistan or Iraq also differs. One group interpretation of religion is stricter (no colour blue, lettuce, cauliflower, etc). All consider the KRI as a safe haven. The Yezedi and Christian are seen as peaceful people and both are discriminated against. The level of education is mixed as are their original livelihoods (government employees, agriculture, etc)

Frequently whole communities have left their villages together when IS/AOGs were approaching or when advised to leave by retreating defence forces.

The recent IDP crisis is still very much fluid, with new people still arriving and possibly more to come in the future weeks if fighting continues. While the influx of Yezidis through Syria seems to have decreased, many still think a new wave of IDPs could come from the Mosul area, in case people manage to get out of IS controlled territory.

Local community humanitarian response

Activities and Strategy

Many have sought refuge with host communities of the same ethnicity. Communities tend to move towards areas where they feel safest, which is among their own religious or ethnic group. 130,000 Christians from Mosul and the Ninewa plains fled to Erbil Governorate in particular its Christian Ainkawa neighbourhood. Here they are hosted by the community and the church with some support from the authorities and minimal support from INGOs. The yezediz from the Sinjal, on the other hand for example, fled in large numbers to Khanake Collective Town. Collective Towns (concentration camps) were used during Saddam Regime's genocides in the region around 25 years ago. These have now formalised into town or suburbs. In Khanake an informal camp of around 1000 tents is annexed to the collective town, the IDPs also live with host families and in schools.

It is only 3 weeks since the displacement and things are still in life-saving mode. No-one is planning on returning soon, some are looking to never return.

Government humanitarian response

Activities and Strategy

- **KRG:** The KRG is responding in 3 distinct ways: coordination through distinct mechanisms in each governorate, management of formal camps with UNHCR and increasing service delivery (engagement of more nurses for example).
 - **Formal Camps:** The KRG is very much focused in setting up camps to host this huge number of people. Resources are directed into that direction. Four camps are open (one in Erbil, three in Dohuk), sheltering nearly 20,000 people. 25 or 27 are planned of which 6 are fully funded.
 - **WASH:** The Dahuk Government Emergency Cell has identified four priority areas: Zakho, Khanke, Shariya, Dahuk City and Batel. Scale-up in services has been requested for the IDP camps of Khanke, Bajet Kandala while preparing for additional camps in Shariya and elsewhere in the governorate. This will require additional funding and increase in capacities in all partners.
- **Iraqi Central Government:** People are reportedly receiving some assistance from authorities, notably water, cash upon registration (1,000,000 IQD/family) and organized transport. The cash assistance is not working properly. The central government (?) are registering the displaced. This is completed in Dohuk Governorate.
- **District, sub-district and neighbourhood:** no further information

Capacities and Funding

- **KRG** is willing and to the largest part a very able responder. There is trust in the UN and international partners both from the KRG, the population and the IDPs. KRG funding levels are unknown.
- **Iraqi Central Government:** Long standing tension between the Central Government and the KRG seems to have come in the way of, for example, distributing cash and coordinating support. Iraqi Central Government received \$500 million from the Saudi government prior to the latest displacements but this is to cover the whole of Iraq. 100 million has been allocated to UNHRC and UNICEF respectively, 50 million for IOM and 10,000 to UN-Habitat. The funds are not solely for Shelter/NFIs.
- **District, sub-district and neighbourhood:** no further information on leadership structures, capacities and funding

International humanitarian response

Activities and Strategy

- **Shelter Cluster (nascent):** supporting the KRG's plans for formal camps and prioritizing families living in schools (est 140,000) and others in mosques, abandoned buildings, other type of shelters including informal settlements and planned camps for shelter and 'ancillary services' interventions, which will need to be concluded before the onset of the winter (within 2 months). Some 26 sites for camps have been identified in the three northern governorates, with a total absorption capacity of approximately **240,000** individuals.

Capacities and Funding:

- **Shelter Cluster participants/UNHCR:** The current resources available (\$?) are insufficient to complete these camps (estimated to be \$?), and some of the pledges made are yet to become firm commitments. Alternative procurement options, including use of the private sector (contractors?), civil protection mechanisms, and possibly even military engineering units are being contemplated as options to immediately enhance response capacity.
- **CARE:** Potentially €600,000

Unmet needs and gaps

Unmet needs

Adequate shelter remains a key concern and a priority need throughout the country. The fact that IDPs are scattered across an extensive number of locations creates considerable challenges for an effective traditional INGO response.

- **Formal camps may have insufficient capacity:** According to IOM's recent Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), shelter and non-food items are ranked second by IDPs as a priority need. (*does this cover all IDPs? Do people in host families rank these as a second priority too?*) The planned formal camps, if all built, will only absorb 30% off all IDPs (total IDPs in KRI 850 000. Source OCHA).
- **Hosting and renting may be unsustainable if unsupported:** More than 50% of the displaced population is living and will continue to be unsupported outside formal camps. There is likely to be a drastic shortfall in assistance to people in non-camp shelter and this may put pressure on both displaced families and the communities and families hosting or accommodating them. It is unclear what will sustain these shelter processes in the longer term but families have reported being provided with food, charity and shelter. This means that a range of non-shelter support may be needed to sustain people in this shelter.
- **People staying in open places and unfinished buildings are largely unsupported:** these groups also appear to be particularly isolated from their social networks back home and in their new location. According to an assessment done by REACH this group represents 8% of the IDPs, which means in Dohuk alone more than 40.000 people.

Coherent international approach

Currently, three packages of support are operating:

- **Households in or moving to formal camps:** a place in a high spec new formal camp, at a high but unknown unit cost¹;
- **Identified/registered households in some areas:** an NFI bundle of clothes and shelter items worth about \$650 (of which \$230 is clothing);
- **All IDPs in all areas:** a central government cash transfer to all IDPs of %1,000 that is reportedly slow and hard to access;
- **Scattered, hard-to-map, unregistered groups:** very little.
- **Existing vulnerable groups and households:** very little

With concerns over instability as new people arrive and sectarian and everyday tensions between people surface, a strategic and equitable response with common humanitarian standards is still needed. This is a risk of inequitable distribution of resources and highly variable shelter conditions if planned settlements are a) highly engineered with high standards and b) there is insufficient capacity in planned camps for current IDPs and future new IDPs or IDPs having to leave hosted/rental situations².

¹ Standards for adequate shelter will quickly be defined by UNHCR's high quality specifications for planned camps. Containers have also been requested. So far these appear to comprise the following:

- Layout in clusters of housing units based on community/family groups; surface water drainage, roads and access; lighting and power supplies. Land per person from UNHCR camp guidelines 35-45m²/person
- WASH: 1 latrine per 50 people, 15l/p/day?
- Shelter: raised concrete floors, floor areas minimum sphere guideline of 3.5m² of covered area?
- Other services: undefined

² One of the criticism of the Haiti response was that the international community confused minimum humanitarian standards and durable solutions for displaced people. Minimum standards are based on a set of assets with a standard value and standard quantities and qualities. Durable solutions are always relative to what the existing population has. In Haiti, the minimum standards that were adopted were very high value relative to housing standards (floor areas and cost of building houses) and this meant that expensive, slow delivery of high value goods came at the expense of approached displaced and indirectly or non-displaced communities as a whole.

Funding and capacity to deliver

It is still unclear whether there is a full assessment of costs of different interventions, coverage likely to be achieved and funding needed v secured

Risks

- Inequitable response and potential instability: currently the response is likely to provide distorted support to different incoming groups and different existing population groups
- Approach of winter: in view of the arrival of winter with rain, dust storm and possible snow by the end of October, there is an urgent need to start a winterization programmes immediately. It is unclear in how far schools and public buildings are included in NFI winterisation distributions.
- Food and fuel supply shortages: the assessment team could not find market data or projections for fuel and food availability for the existing and IDP population. Kerosene is the fuel used for winter heating and for existing community electricity generators and the combined pressure on prices from higher demand is unknown. Food is already rationed/subsidised but delivery was already inconsistent. Food may be the key to sustaining host relationships.

Humanitarian Standards

Humanitarian standards have not yet been agreed but the need for an equitable approach was raised in the latest TWG minutes (TWG minutes 1st September). For the purposes of this assessment:

- **Adequate shelter** is understood, in line with the Iraqi Housing Policy's definition of decent housing, as: an adequate amount of space, adequate protection from the elements, and access to basic infrastructure, social services, and employment areas.
- **Winterized households:** non-camp shelter varies from tents to unfinished buildings to host/rental in typical housing (concrete frame with blockwork infill, no insulation and kerosene heaters). Households may require a variety of material for winter (cash, vouchers or a bundle of appropriate or roughly equivalent value): Clothing; Non-tent NFIs for unfinished/finished buildings; Tent NFIs; Winterisation for spontaneous collective centres; settlement among host communities in tents on vacant land, unfinished buildings or with individual host families; isolated self-settled camps or individual urban settlement in rented housing and hotels or individual host families; Fuel supplies or vouchers (Stoves are not the priority in winterisation, clothes, blankets and a roof are. The KRG recognises this.)
- **Winterised settlements:** Measures to winterise individual households (with NFIs or shelter upgrades) will not be sufficient if conditions at the settlement level make it difficult to stay warm and dry. Options at settlement level include: Surface water drainage and snow clearing committees: repairing, upgrading or installing surface water drainage and providing snow clearing equipment and area committees to manage clearance; Warm, dry community centres: shared, communal warm spaces or drying areas can have multiple uses during the day/night. Large, insulated tents with heaters or rehabilitated empty buildings close to tents or informal camps can be used.

The following summary of benchmarks for adequate shelter is based on pre-existing context for comparison as more is understood about current conditions.

- **Average plot and floor areas (Erbil and Dohuk): nationally 63m²-250m², target in Erbil 150m².** More than 40% of people in Erbil and Dohuk live with between 10-19m² per person, more than 25% in 20-39m²/person and less than 5% of the population living in less than 5m²/person (higher than Sphere minimum of 3.5m²/person). Typical land areas per person are more than 100-149m²/person (camp planning guidance suggests 35-45m² of land area/person, this is clearly a much higher density of occupation than local settlement planning standards.
- **Average rents (Erbil and Dohuk):** In 2009, UN-Habitat reported average monthly rents in Erbil between \$120 (IQD 136,000) and \$1200 (IQD 1,358,000), with the average in the city being \$411 (IQD 465,000), which is close to the average monthly income of \$478 (IQD 541,000)³. About half of all rental units are in the two most expensive rental categories. More recently, the Affordable Housing Strategy compares income and housing affordability for three income groups:

Population Group in KRI 2012	Monthly income	Annual Income (USD)	Affordable House (USD)
Low income	400	4,800	24,000
Middle income	600	7,200	36,000
Upper income	1,000	12,000	60,000

Source: the Affordable Housing Strategies in Kurdistan Region 2012

- **Average house building prices for comparison with transitional shelter kits/containers/camps (Erbil):** Average costs are "between \$133 and \$330 per square meter with an average price of \$217 per square meter". RC frame with masonry infill is the dominant construction typology.
- **Services:** 90% of people in Dohuk are connected to a public network or septic tank while in Erbil this figure is closer to 30% with open drains the main type of sanitation. Dohuk and Erbil have about 70% coverage of households by municipal waste collection but these collection systems are likely to be

³ Based on 2009 exchange rate from oanda.com

under pressure with the new population increase. Gas is the primary cooking fuel source and kerosene is the primary heating fuel source. 60% of Erbil relies on community generators for electricity and 36% are connected to the public network. 74% of people in Dohuk are on the public network compared to 22% using community generators. Presumably these generators rely on some kind of fuel oil so any shortage of winter fuel supplies will have a knock on effect on electricity prices for the host communities. Kerosene is not part of the ration system, only food items are.

Types of displacement sites

Types of displacement sites	Needs / Gaps/ capacity in terms of sheltering/ housing market incl HLP Protection Gender	Needs/ Gaps in terms of WASH incl HLP Protection Gender	Analysis	Estimates IDP in KRI, August 2014 ***
<p>Unfinished Buildings</p> <p>In urban (concentration in Zakho and Dohuk) and in towns (along main roads) – also in rural?</p> <p>Mainly commercial multi-storey concrete framed but also domestic.</p> <p>Buildings in various stages of completion. Mostly only slabs and columns skeleton complete and no walls. Largely no connection to services.</p>	<p>Not winterised. Some have carpets on the concrete floor.</p> <p>Lack of privacy. Some have put blankets up.</p> <p>Various degrees of coping. For example some have cooking facilities and water tanks. Others rely on receiving cooked food and drink.</p> <p>Dispersed and mobile population. Isolation due to dispersement means lack information (example to know where the local health facility is). Locations have not been mapped yet.</p> <p>At the moment there seems to be no eviction threats.</p>	<p>Toilets and washing facilities largely missing.</p> <p>Unfinished to various degrees, but largely not connected to sewage, water, etc. 90% of people in Dohuk are connected to a public network or septic tank, in Erbil this is 30%.</p> <p>Sometimes fresh water is accessed from neighbours, as can electricity.</p>	<p>Most vulnerable.</p> <p>The KRG recognises that this group needs assistance, despite the KRGs push for formal camps.</p> <p>Relying nearly solely on ad-hoc charity from neighbours / host community / KRG for NFI and FI.</p> <p>This group is underserved. No strategy at all by KRG and its partners on how to get this group into a sustainable shelter/WASH situation. The situation does however bode opportunities, which could potentially lead to more cost effective and sustainable solutions.</p> <p>By supporting the host communities for example.</p>	<p>16%</p> <p>Or 136 000 IDPs</p>
<p>private/ informal tented / make shift camps + collective centres</p> <p>in urban and semi - rural locations (also in rural locations?)</p> <p>Semi assisted/ unplanned camps. Relying largely on charity from neighbours, but also a variety of actors mainly non – UN. The KRG is present but not formally involved.</p> <p>Example Wargh Dala Camp/ Zakho (950 families) or forecourt of a</p>	<p>Not winterised. Families in tents or makeshift shelters.</p> <p>It appears that until now there are no eviction threats.</p>	<p>Support to host communities and neighbours?</p>	<p>Vulnerable.</p> <p>The KRG recognises that this group needs assistance, despite the KRGs push for formal camps.</p>	<p>7%</p> <p>Or 58 500 IDPs</p>

petrol station / Zakho (10 – 20 families) , Party Hall (privately owned) houses 600 IDPs				
School – the KRG are housing IDPs in government run school. The Headmasters are managing the site.	Overcrowded conditions in solid structures. The KRG's priority to empty the schools, school start is already delayed. (1 month, unconfirmed) The IDPs have been told to vacate by 15 September.	Overcrowded. Using bathrooms in Schools. Water is trucked. Some emergency toilets have been built (connected to pits or septic tanks or a network?). Washing facilities missing. The bathrooms will have to be rehabilitated (desludging etc) before the school opens.	It is expected that IDPs in schools (140 000 IDPs) will be moved to the camps first. This is not a prioritization according to need but to allow for the KRI education system to run.	15% Or 127500 IDPs
Formal Camps – KRG/ UNHCR planned and managed – high standard – largely run by UN agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF, etc) with their IPs (NRC, Barzani Foundation, Harekar, etc) * (camps by UNHCR, AFAD (Turkish government), MSB, THW)	Formally planned camps with facilities, services and management plans. Largely tented (HHs and collective) but containers have been requested by KRG. Largely not winterised. Winterisation through concrete base, apron wall, lining (heater?) 26 sites identified by KRG. Identification of land is difficult in Erbil Governorate. 6 are fully funded and actors identified. Funding towards construction of the planned 25 camps and management requested by UN/. (exactly how much unclear)	Funding towards construction and management needed. (how much is unclear)	Around 600 000 IDP will rely on non – camp solutions. Projected of formal camps capacity, if all 25 camps, are built is 240 000 (source: IDP Sit Rep no9 OCHA 29 august 2014), 6 camps are fully funded so far. As of 27 August, four camps are open (one in Erbil, three in Dahuk), sheltering nearly 20,000 people.(source: IDP Sit Rep no9 OCHA 29 august 2014). If all camps are built, and if the 140 000 IDPs currently living in schools move to the camps, then this leaves space for around 60 000 IDPs. (own calculation) leaving around 600 000 IDP in non-camp settings.	8% Or 68 000 IDPs
Rental	<i>little information available.</i>		<i>Little , if any attention, by KRG and International community .</i>	62% Or 442 000 IDPs
With host-families and relatives				
Religious Institutions Ainkawa Church example				
Hotels				
			TOTAL IDPs (OCHA)	850 000

*** % from IOM DTM overview 24th of august if number of displaced is 850 000 as reported by IDP Sit Rep no9 OCHA 29 august 2014

Programming Recommendations

Needs	Options on proposed key activities	Details on program (support requirements and other logistics and resource requirements)	Target groups					Comments
			Private/informal tented / make	Unfinished Buildings	Rental + Hotels	With Host families & relatives	Host Community	
Adequate equitable Shelter for all (Sustainable non-camp shelter solutions)	Support to KRG/Cluster to identify alternative shelter solutions and piloting them <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessment and analysis Proofing concepts Practical recommendations to others 	Small team with this specific ToR (20 000 euros)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The planned 25 formal camps can only absorb 240 000 of the IDP IF they are all built. * (see above) This leaves at least 600 000 IDPs in non- camp settings. The formal camps will be costly to run and alternative shelter solutions are generally cheaper and more sustainable, support local markets, upgrade of existing infrastructure / buildings etc Timely – Shelter / NFI cluster being established first week of September. Allows Care to change direction if needed Little visibility in terms of activity but known and networked (funders) <i>What does KRG need to do this? Do they want to do this? Why is the cluster not doing this?</i>
		or Second Care staff into Shelter/ NFI Cluster and financially support a multi-actor assessment. (50 000 euros)						
Winterisation of shelter	Creation of collective warm spaces (winterised communal tents or rehabilitation of existing communal buildings) with technical assistance to community on how to winterize tents and settlement with very limited NFI.	Agreement with management of and/or community Procurement of NFIs - <i>international tender? From Turkey by road? What are CARE's procurement thresholds in numbers and time periods for international tenders?</i> Partner with technical experience of winterisation of shelter and settlement (possible Harekar) Care Staff on the ground	✓	✓				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Timely – but maybe too late? 'Care is good at doing various things in one location, less good at 1 thing in many locations' Life saving activity Innovative: demonstrate alternative to expensive formal camps Innovative: addressing the IDPs as a community and building on their capacity. The winterisation activities can lead to further assistance to community. Large tents are multi-purpose and can be used as information centres, education, sun shade, etc. Adopting a community might lead to long term commitment / responsibilities Rub hall with linings; or school tents with linings as per Turkey

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> last year Will identifying a community be straightforward? What criteria should be used?
	Distribution of winterization NFI (self – help kit with little technical assistance)	<p>Distribution cycle (assessment, identification, distribution, monitoring)</p> <p>Procurement of NFIs - <i>international tender (1 month before even moving materials)? From Turkey by road? What are CARE's procurement thresholds in numbers and time periods for international tenders?</i></p> <p>Partner with technical experience of winterisation of shelter and settlement (possible Harekar)</p> <p>Care Staff in the KRI (first estimate 650 USD / family incl clothes)</p>		✓				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Timely – but maybe too late? Life saving activity
Clothing	Distribution of clothing NFI family kits	<p>Distribution cycle (assessment, identification, distribution, monitoring)</p> <p>Procurement of NFIs - <i>international tender? From Turkey by road? What are CARE's procurement thresholds in numbers and time periods for international tenders?</i></p> <p>Partner with technical experience of winterisation of shelter and settlement (Harekar?)</p> <p>Care Staff in the KRI (very approx. 230 USD/ family kit)</p>	✓	✓				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tricky to compose kit! Timely – but maybe too late? Short term engagement Life saving activity Visibility
	Clothing Fair (Based on Care's DRC Goma – bringing all vendors and selected IDPs to one place, traders benefit)	<p>Identification of vendors and beneficiaries</p> <p>Set up one-off event</p>	✓	✓			✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Good visibility Build on Care's experience Support local markets – the markets are working, proximity to Turkey Tailored to individual need

	while IDPs get choice) Similar scheme can be set up for Winterisation NFIs.	Partner (START?) Care Staff in the KRI						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No long term engagement Life saving activity
	Vouchers to buy at the local market	Identification of vendors and beneficiaries Partner (START?) Care Staff in the KRI	✓	✓			✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support local markets – the markets are working, proximity to Turkey No long term engagement Life saving activity
Information	Information centres (accessing government + humanitarian assistance, nullifying rumours about immigration possibilities?, etc)		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Building on experience of Syrian Response CARE Jordan. Within Ensure not to duplicate with the Call Service being set up by cluster

Best practice

Best practice guidance in the shelter sector includes strategic options for indirectly affected, displaced and non-displaced groups and a variety of assistance and delivery methods matched to each situation (Shelter Centre et al., 2010) and minimum standards for settlements and shelter (Sphere, 2011). Currently, the "planned camps" option (highlighted in red) for the displaced population is supported by KRG and UNHCR with other displaced people and existing vulnerable groups unserved.

Assistance Options

Clothing, personal insulation shelter-related Non-Food Items

- **Cash:** where risks of transporting cash (for beneficiaries and CARE and partners) is low and markets are offering sufficient diversity and quantity of the supplies prioritised by beneficiaries.
- **Community NFI fairs with vouchers:** where choice in local markets is limited but vendors and supply chains can be mobilised to increase what is available.
- **Direct distribution:** when nearby markets are unable to ensure sufficient diversity and quantity of the supplies prioritised by beneficiaries.

Below is an example from DRC, where local markets were remote with limited goods.

Why not use direct distribution?

While direct distribution of food, NFI and other relief items was possible in Walikale, logistically it would have been time-consuming and expensive to bring relief supplies to Walikale zone by road. The nearby markets were able to ensure sufficient diversity and quality of supplies that were identified as priorities by beneficiaries, making a cash-based approach a viable option. This mechanism also provided many advantages in terms of beneficiary choice, appropriateness of the response to meet diverse needs and stimulating the local economy.

Why use voucher fairs - why not give cash?

The voucher mechanism was considered a safer alternative to cash transfers, as it limited risks associated with distributing and transporting cash for both beneficiaries and implementing partners. Assessments showed that the local markets did not offer a wide selection of the goods beneficiaries needed. In the case of this programme where the objective is to meet essential NFI needs by presenting a wide variety of choice, a cash option would have limited many families' options to what was available locally. By mobilising vendors from the territory's commercial centres to participate in fairs in more remote areas, voucher fairs provide beneficiaries with a wider array of choice than they might have on the open market: in post-fair surveys across multiple provinces, 65% of families reported that the items they purchased at the fairs are not easily available in their local shops or markets.

Why use value-based cash vouchers at the fairs?

Value-based cash vouchers provide a significant advantage over direct NFI distribution or commodity vouchers in that they allow beneficiaries to choose any combination of items that meet their specific needs. This flexibility would not have been possible with an in-kind or commodity voucher approach..

Source: (The Cash Learning Partnership, 2011)

Host Community, Host Family and Rental Support Options

There are a number of options for assistance methods that have a minimal impact on local populations or that take into account the needs or pressures faced by host communities. Where host communities have used their own resources (food, shelter/WASH, money), it may be necessary to target resources to sustaining hosting rather than relocate people into camps should these relationships become unsustainable or break down:

- **Host community support:** identify the services and systems that are under increased pressure because of IDP arrivals and target resources at these systems (eg waste collection, water systems, sanitation, schools, health care facilities) outside camps i.e. existing KRG systems and services. Save the Children in northern Syria provided infrastructure support to their Health, Education and Nutrition programmes by rehabilitating dilapidated or unoccupied buildings or procuring and installing large insulated tents for

community facilities including temporary learning spaces, mother and baby areas and new latrine blocks.

- **Host family support:** allow hosted and host families to access support in order to sustain hosting arrangements for as long as possible. CHF in Haiti offered host families a "menu" of goods that added up to a similar value including school vouchers, food, shelter materials and latrine kits. CARE in DRC offered host families extensions to their houses on the condition that hosted families could continue to live in the new, additional space.
- **Rental support:** this has been considered but probably under-explored in the region (Lebanon, Jordan, Syria) but has been implemented in Lebanon 2011, Haiti 2010-12 and Japan 2011-12.

CARE's capacity and experience in the region

CARE has offices in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey undertaking a range of programming, including Shelter, WASH, case management and protection. Considerable experience of urban and out-of-camp programming, including cash transfer programming, has been amassed over the length of the Syria crisis. A regional support team provides leadership and support to the individual Country Offices.

CARE UK has a dedicated team of shelter specialists and experience seconding staff into the cluster system. This team has been giving support to CARE Jordan and Lebanon over the past three years.

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Existing Housing Context in KRI

This section is the basis for benchmarking equitable humanitarian standards for the response, area by area and household by household.

- **Government mandates and housing policy:** the Ministry of Construction and Housing is responsible for the national housing policy. According to this policy (Ministry of Construction and Housing, 2010), there is already unmet housing demand across the country (2m dwellings required by 2016, 200,000 per year for the next 10 years); "shortages of buildable land in urban areas"; housing in poor repair with "between 30% and 50% of housing in older, central city areas ... in poor condition (needing major structural rehabilitation) or uninhabitable"; and an absence of affordable mortgage finance to build and repair houses, especially low access among low income households who find it difficult to meet the requirements to qualify for loans. In Kurdistan, housing priorities are measures related to land, financing, housing provision, building materials, and social infrastructure (Ministry of Planning and Kurdistan Regional Government, 2013). In Erbil, UN-Habitat drafted a housing strategy for the city that already identifies IDPs within the target groups for housing: high priority (low **(28.3%)** and very low **(31.5%)** income households earning less than \$450/month, IDPs, returnees, women-headed households); medium priority **(29.2%)** (those living in informal areas, in small overcrowded or substandard housing, tenants or those living in shared accommodation), low priority **(11%)** (other households). **This recognises that IDPs and other low income groups in the city find themselves in inadequate housing.**
- **Construction sector:** nationally, very few large firms with enough capital to build "high-density multi-story housing"; "few existing mid-sized housing developers that can produce small and medium multi-unit housing (5-50 units)"; and most housing "constructed by small-scale builders who work for individual clients that provide the design and financing for the house and help meet "demand for single-family and low-rise housing". The structure of the market for building materials means suppliers complain of "high prices and shortages of raw materials, transportation difficulties, poor quality of inputs, and frequent lack of electricity"
- **Rate of housing demand and construction:** In Erbil, UN-Habitat has estimated an annual demand for housing of 3,500 units and estimates the current capacity of the housing market as: private sector building 500 units/year (for upper and upper middle income groups); public-private contractors 1,000-1,500 units/year (blocks of flats for middle income; the small scale and informal sector 500-1000 units/year

Shelter and housing processes:

- sheltering in unfinished buildings
- sheltering in rental accommodation
- sheltering in hotel accommodation
- sheltering with a host family
- sheltering in a tent on vacant land

Prior to the recent IDP arrivals, in Erbil, families have been meeting housing needs through a number of processes (Mumtaz, 2009):

- land given (government employees, handicapped); houses built and managed according to household resources
- land subsidised by government and sold to investment companies; houses built on residential campus and sold on open market
- existing houses adapted, extended or modified and managed according to household resources

- apartments built by government, allocated to selected occupiers and rent subsidised (95%)
- land from sale of half a family plot (originally provided at subsidised rate by government); house built using funds from sale
- house purchased from a developer or another owner
- house rented but high rental cost compared to family income (25% of households, of which 62% in poor condition)

Estimated population growth rates in Erbil City are 3.2% in 2007 (Mumtaz, 2009) and for Kurdistan as a whole this was estimated at 2.5% in 2010 (Kurdistan Board of Investment, 2014).


Population (average household size)(COSIT et al., 2007)


	Governorate capital	Other urban	Rural	Total
Duhok	232,000 (7)	416,000 (6.3)	246,000 (6.5)	895,000 (6.5)
Erbil	717,000 (6.3) (now according to KRG over 1 million)	433,000 (6.4)	259,000 (6.8)	1,409,000 (6.4)
Kurdistan	1,578,000 (5.9)	1,493,000 (6.1)	807,000 (6.5)	3,878,000 (6.1) (according to KRG own figures 5.2 million)
Iraq	12,499,000 (6.6)	8,843,000 (6.6)	8,755,000 (7.6)	30,097,000 (6.9)

Housing, land and property

- Individual family houses are the dominant housing type but this will vary in specific affected areas.
- Duhok and Erbil are around 80% owner occupiers, with 8.5% and 13% renting in Duhok and Erbil respectively

Issues with land, particularly in Erbil, are covered in more detail by UN-Habitat (Mumtaz, 2009, pp. 16–23)





Existing Housing Stock

- **Housing standards:** the Iraqi housing policy defines “decent housing”: an adequate amount of space, adequate protection from the elements, and access to basic infrastructure, social services, and employment areas.
- **Housing floor areas:** nationally “[m]ost residential plots are between 180-250m² and dwelling size varies little around 140-215m²” but “these norms impose costs that are not affordable to all households (Ministry of Construction and Housing, 2010). In Erbil, the housing strategy compares formal housing (180m²), average housing (157m²), minimum housing (63m²) and target housing (150m²) (Mumtaz, 2009).
- **Quality of rental housing stock:** “[a]bout 90 percent of landlords reportedly make no investment in maintenance or rehabilitation” and “poor conditions of private rental housing (which accounts for more than 90 percent of the urban rental housing stock) is complemented by the poor quality of services to the housing. 5-10% of the rental stock belongs to the Government and tend to be high-rise, low rent but not necessarily targeted to low-income or vulnerable groups.
- **Unfinished buildings and vacant land:** in some countries buildings are deliberately left unfinished to exempt them from property taxes. This is unlikely in Iraq as “there is no annual tax on occupied property and the established tax on vacant land is not collected”. Instead, properties are probably unfinished because the construction boom has slowed and developers have either run out of money or have decided the potential returns on property are not worth the final investment to complete a building. Homeowners in Kurdistan also faced inflation in material and land prices during the Kurdistan construction boom (Dinmore, 2005; Qadir, 2007), for example, prices for block rose by 400% in 2005 (IIER, 2005). Since 2004, Erbil City has nearly doubled its housing plots from less than 80,000 to nearly 150,000 by “the allocation of new land or the subdivision of previously allocated plots” and 50,000 remain “vacant and not built-upon” (Mumtaz, 2009).
- **House prices:** in 2009, UN-Habitat estimated typical family apartment costs at \$85,000-\$150,000 (IQD 98m-170m). A parallel luxury housing market has put pressure on land and property prices “a 200-square-meter villa in 2010 [in Erbil] sold for \$350 per square meter (IQD 395,000). That same unit in 2013 averaged \$1,250 per square meter (IQD 1,412,000), more than tripling in value over three years.” (CNN, 2014). This is a rise from \$70,000 (IQD 79m) to \$250,000 (IQD 282m), which is in line with UN-Habitat's estimates.
- **House building prices:** in 2009, house building costs in Erbil were “\$12,819 and \$66,115 for the cheapest and most expensive house types (historical and public housing estates) – the average price of housing units in the city is \$37,734”. **This is “between \$133 and \$330 per square meter with an average price of \$217 per square meter”.**



These figures for rental payment date from 2007 and 2009 so the values are not current but the distributions by category remain interesting and may provide a useful benchmark for up to date rental market surveys to monitor the impact of IDPs on rents.

These data suggest that in Erbil about 45% of rental accommodation is in the two most expensive categories (more than 300,000 ID per month) but an even spread of 10-15% of housing in each lower cost category. By 2009, UN-Habitat reported average monthly rents in Erbil between \$120 (IQD 136,000) and \$1200 (IQD 1,358,000), with the average in the city being \$411 (IQD 465,000), which is close to the average monthly income of \$478 (IQD 541,000)⁴.

In Duhouk, the proportion of very low cost rental (<50,000 per month) housing is lower at about 5% and medium and high end rental accommodation makes up more than 80% of what is available (100,000 ID per month).

More than 40% of people in Erbil and Duhouk live with between 10-19m² per person, more than 25% in 20-39m²/person and less than 5% of the population living in less than 5m²/person.


The Sphere standard advises interpreting in the context an adequate, minimum covered floor area with the guideline at 3.5m²/person - clearly much lower than the local shelter standards.



⁴ Based on 2009 exchange rate from oanda.com



Typical land areas per person are more than 100-149m²/person. These figures are slightly lower in Erbil which means the average density of occupation is higher.

Camp planning guidance suggests 35-45m² of land area/person, this is clearly a much higher density of occupation than local settlement planning standards.




Building types, materials and services

Typical wall and ceiling materials in Duhouk and Erbil differ from other parts of the country and are dominated by cement block. This is likely to be a function of the age of the housing stock - Kurdistan is experiencing a boom, Baghdad is an older, larger, established city.



Dohouk and Erbil differ in their access to sanitation.


90% of people in Dohouk are connected to a public network or septic tank while in Erbil this figure is closer to 30% with open drains the main type of sanitation.




Douhouk and Erbil have high coverage of municipal waste collection at 70%+ compared to the rest of Iraq.

These collection systems are likely to be under pressure with the new population increase.

In Duhouk, 70% of electricity supplies are from the public network. In Erbil, this figure is less than 40% with supplies made up by community generators – running on the same fuel sources as winter heaters.



Primary heating fuel source



Primary cooking fuel source

